Uit CIA documenten, gepubliceerd op Wikileaks blijkt nu, dat de VS al in 1986 aanstuurde op een staatsgreep tegen Hafes Assad (Hafes el-Assad, de vader van de huidige Syrische president Bashar al-Assad)......
In 1986 was de maffe sociopaat en oorlogsmisdadiger Reagan president van de VS. Ook toen drong de CIA aan op het organiseren van een opstand en coup tegen het Syrische bewind. Destijds zag men de sjiitische bevolking als groep die opgezet moest worden tegen Assad. Dit terwijl juist Assad destijds, als zijn zoon tot voor 2011 de verschillende religieuze groeperingen vreedzaam met elkaar deden samenleven.......
Met de opstand die de grootste terreurentiteit op aarde, de VS in 2011 wist uit te lokken, mede door grote aantallen IS en Al Qaida strijders vanuit Libië te vervoeren richting Syrië, is deze vreedzame manier van samenleven voor een fiks deel de nek omgedraaid..........
Hier het artikel op 10 april jl. door Information Clearing House gelinkt naar Sputnik International, die het op 10 april jl. bracht:
Sifting through the CIA's database of 11 million+ declassified documents, WikiLeaks has uncovered a report from 1986 on "possible scenarios that could lead to the ouster of President Assad." Pointing to the potential for exploiting sectarian tensions, the report nonetheless ironically explains why the US's current regime change strategy is wrong.
Predating the 2011 Arab Spring unrest which would engulf Syria in a bloody foreign-backed civil war by nearly a quarter of a century, the CIA report offered an effective proto blueprint for US intelligence to play up factionalism between the Alawite minority (to which the Assad family belongs) and Sunni Muslims, who make up around three quarters of Syria's population.
The document pointed out that while tensions between the Alawites and Sunnis had declined significantly by the mid-1980s, "the potential for serious communal violence remains." In fact, the report's authors argued that a sectarian conflict leading to civil war is one of the top three options for regime change in Syria, the other two being a succession power struggle and military setbacks abroad in Lebanon or Israel sparking a coup.
"A Sunni rebellion in the late 1970s and early 1980s ended when Assad crushed the Muslim Brotherhood that spearheaded it," the report noted. It added, however that "although we judge that fears of reprisals and organizational problems make a second Sunni challenge unlikely, an excessive government reaction to minor outbreaks of Sunni dissidence might trigger large-scale unrest. In most instances the regime would have the resources to crush a Sunni opposition movement, but we believe widespread violence among the populace could stimulate large numbers of Sunni officers and conscripts to desert or mutiny, setting the stage for civil war."
The failed 'Sunni challenge' being referred to was the February 1982 storming of Hama, known in the West as the 'Hama Massacre', in which the Syrian government crushed an Islamist uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood-led in the western Syrian city of Hama. The storming of the city resulted in the deaths of hundreds of soldiers and militants and several thousand civilians.
Without getting into too many details, the report claimed that any new "general campaign of Alawi violence against Sunnis might push even moderate Sunnis to join the opposition. Remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood – some returning from exile in Iraq – could provide a core of leadership for the movement."
Furthermore, the report estimated that "although the regime has the resources to crush such a venture, we believe brutal attacks on Sunni civilians might prompt large numbers of Sunni officers and conscripts to desert or stage mutinies in support of dissidents, and Iraq might supply them with sufficient weapons to launch a civil war."
Expanding on the latter idea, the report explained that "business moderates would see a strong need for Western aid and investment to build Syria's private economy, thus opening the way for stronger ties with Western governments."
Interestingly, unlike its Obama-era successors, the CIA of the 1980s had warned that any prolonged chaos and civil war in Syria would turn it into a "dangerously erratic force in the region," and adding that "a weak government in Damascus might heighten Syria's attractiveness as a base for terrorism."
Ironically, the report also warned that any gains the US might see by Assad's ouster "would be mitigated…if Sunni fundamentalists assumed power. The reason, again, has to do with Israel's security: "Although Syria's secular traditions would make it extremely difficult for religious zealots to establish an Islamic Republic, should they succeed they would likely deepen hostilities with Israel and provide support and sanctuary for terrorist groups."
It's unknown whether the CIA of the 1980s genuinely believed that the 'moderates' in whom they placed their hopes wouldn't immediately be swallowed up by radical Islamists, although US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s make it unlikely that the CIA of the 2000s couldn't foresee such an eventuality.
Klik voor meer berichten n.a.v. het bovenstaande, op één van de labels, die u hieronder terug kan vinden, dit geldt niet voor de labels: bloedbad van Hama, W. Eagleton en D. Ross.
Mijn excuus voor de vormgeving.